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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Difficulties and Opportunities in Building Resilient Clinical Monitoring Systems with
Wireless Sensor Networks
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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) can play an important role in improving patient care by collecting
continuous vital signs and using it, in real-time, for clinical decision support. This Masters Thesis
presents the architecture of, and our experiences with such a system. Our system encompasses
portable wireless pulse oximeters, a wireless relay network spanning multiple hospital floors, and
integration into the hospital Clinical Data Repository (CDR) database. We report our experience and
lessons learned from a 14-month clinical trial of the system in six hospital wards of Barnes-Jewish
Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri.

Such a deployment of a computer system around people daily lives makes it a Cyber Physical System
(CPS) and exposes numerous challenges, where the advantages of WSN (for example being very low
power) are in conflict with the unforgiving environment (for example overcoming interference in a
heavily populated hospital, despite a low power transmission). As this Masters Thesis will show such
a CPS can be made reliable, but there are numerous integration points in which the system can (and
did) fail. Our experiences show the feasibility of achieving reliable vital sign collection, using a
ix

wireless sensor network integrated with hospital IT infrastructure and procedures. We highlight
technical and non-technical elements that pose challenges in a real-world hospital environment and
provide guidelines for successful and efficient deployment of similar systems. At the end of this
paper we hope that we will have given enough evidence and recommendations to convince the
reader that the question “Can CPS that uses a WSN enjoy the advantages of very low power wireless
communication, and be made reliable in a hospital environment?” is no longer open.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Early detection of clinical deterioration is essential to improving clinical outcome. Study
has shown that 4 – 17% of patients will undergo cardiopulmonary or respiratory arrest
while in the hospital as a result of clinical deterioration [1]. However, even following
acute operations nurses measure the vital signs only 10 times during the first 24 hours
[2], and much less vital sign taking is performed in less acute care hospital wards.
Wireless sensor network (WSN) can enable real time detection of clinical deterioration
by collecting continuous vital signs from patients, providing continuous coverage and
alerts that could save lives. WSN also have the advantage that patients do not need to
stay confined to their beds to benefit from monitoring. Compared to commercial
telemetry systems, WSNs based on low-power network have advantages in both power
efficiency and cost-effective deployment without fixed infrastructure [3]; and they are
also an apt choice for field deployments.
While earlier deployment of WSNs in hospitals have shown promise [3, 4, 5, 6], they are
not sufficient (including our own previous deployment) for clinical detection because
their standalone WSNs are not integrated with the hospital’s Clinical Data Repository
(CDR1) and IT infrastructure and procedures – two key integration challenges that must
be addressed in order to build clinical warning systems. Moreover, existing deployments
tend to be limited to a single ward, while large-scale and long-term deployments
spanning multiple clinical wards are needed to demonstrate the feasibility of WSN
technology in hospitals. Such systems, deployed in close proximity people’s habitats, for
1

The CDR is typically used for data analysis, clinical research, and training and is separate from the
production EMR (Electronic Medical Records), but it offers similar integration challenges in terms of
hospital IT security procedures, and using the same data transport and messaging system for integrating
between our system and the hospital system.
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the benefit of people are Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). The continuous rub between
people and the CPS surface challenges that must be addressed for the system to be
reliable.
Our system and longitudinal clinical trial exercised these rub points and this Masters
Thesis presents the architecture and deployment of our end-to-end clinical monitoring
system. Our system integrates portable wireless pulse oximeters for patients, wireless
relay networks spanning multiple hospital floors and wards, and departmental servers
communicating with the hospital’s Clinical Data Repository (CDR) database. This study
is distinguished from the previous by the CDR integration and the study’s scale.
Exposing at least some of the rub points that similar CPS will encounter (we in fact
suggest that any CPS deployment around people’s daily lives will face similar challenges
and could benefit from the recommendations we make). The system collects real-time
vital sign data from the pulse-oximeters, transmits it to base stations over the wireless
relay networks, and then feeds the data to CDR in real time, where it resides along with
an historical corpus of the traditional clinical data. This enriched CDR data is then used
to detect clinical deterioration using data mining techniques [1]. At the end of our
clinical trial the system has been deployed for 14 months at Barnes-Jewish Hospital in
St. Louis, with the first ward deployed in April 2011. The system spans three hospital
floors, monitor patients in four floors, six wards, has between 14 to 16 wireless ”relay”
nodes in each ward, four fixed ”base station” servers, and is integrated to the legacy
hospital CDR systems.
Although our deployment’s CDR integration, spatial scope, and duration may appear to
have subtle differences from prior studies, these differences have had a surprisingly
profound effect on the system’s performance with many important design
considerations for future deployments. The key lessons we learned are: (1) Multiple base
stations can be used to increase the network reliability and resilience to hospital events.
(2) Fault tolerant design is necessary to progress towards production-wordy CPS
deployments. (3) We (re)discover the importance of end user indicators. (4) As part of
the planning process, human factors must be addressed before the deployment starts.
2

(5) Hospital deployments must be treated fundamentally differently from lab (and even
small scale, real) deployments, which typically focus on system issues. They must be
engineered from the ground up to consider organization IT and hospital procedures.
The lessons learned during this deployment can serve as guidelines for future clinical
deployments of WSN-based systems, and more generally to any large WSN deployment
in the physical world where people presence is expected.

3

Chapter 2
Overview of the Clinical Trial
This fourteen month clinical trial is a joint research among Washington University
School of Engineering, Washington University School of Medicine, and Barnes Jewish
Hospital (BJH). The system deployed during this trial collects blood oxygenation and
heart rate readings from consented patients every 1 minute. These readings are collected
with the eventual goal of predicting patient deterioration by combining real-time vital
signs of a patient with traditional clinical data of (similar) patients available in CDR.
The system discussed in this paper is part of a long-term effort to improve hospital care
through prediction of imminent clinical deterioration and enabling physicians and
nurses to render information-guided, and timely, attention to their patients. Our
ultimate objective is to improve people’s health, recovery during hospitalization, and
reduce hospital readmission by extending the system reach to patient’s homes. In order
to achieve these goals we envision a novel two-tier system for clinical early warning [1].
The first tier uses data mining algorithms on existing hospital data records to identify
patients at risk of clinical deterioration. Those identified patients will wear low-power,
compact sensing devices that will collect and communicate real-time vital signs through
a WSN. The second tier combines both the real-time sensor data and traditional clinical
data to predict clinical deterioration, as well as suggest the most relevant clinical reasons
based on data mining algorithms. This point is wordy of a short reminder for future
studies. Even though the part of the system described in [1] showed that clinical events
could be detected with accuracy of 0.9292 our physician collaborators wants more, and
rightfully so. Because an early warning, rendered by the system before the onset of
clinical conditions is detectable to the naked eye or by examination, is not practically
useful. An expert system that will provide clues as for the possible reasons of the
4

eminent deterioration is required. High-level description of the two-tier system
architecture and preliminary results on the early warning, based on traditional clinical
data (tier-1) was presented in [1], followed by an in-depth study of data mining
algorithms for traditional clinical data presented in [7]. This Thesis is focused on the
question weather it is realistic to build such systems with using WSN technology.

2.1

Patient Enrollment

In this sub-section we provide some details on the participant sample population and
anecdotal field observations. A tier-1 data mining algorithm runs on the CDR database
to identify patient at risk and alerts the study coordinator. The coordinator then tried to
consent the patient to participate in the clinical trial. Table 2.1 presents the results of
this enrollment process: Of the total of 355 patients tier-1 module triggered on, data
was collected from 75 patients, another 12 consented but did not have data collected
(this could occur, for example, when the device is not turned ON after placing it on a
patient), and 42 refused consent. The remaining patients did not have the opportunity
to consent due to their medical condition (being in contact isolation, not in their room
when the study coordinator went to consent them, or were too sick to respond, and so
on. See the table for more details). Beyond these 355 patients, an additional 173 patients
were excluded from the table because they were discharged from the hospital before
enrollment.
Table 2.1 Patient consent results.
Status
Consented
Consented, but not data was collected
Refused consent
Contact isolation
Not available or responsive
Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
Not appropriate per nursing
Dementia
Total

Count
75
12
42
131
67
15
10
3
355
5

Percent
21.1
3.4
11.8
36.9
18.9
4.2
2.8
0.9
100.00

Tables 2.2 present the demographics of the 75 volunteers. The mean age of participants
was 58 years.
Table 2.2 Demographics of the 75 consented patients.
Race
Black
Caucasian
Other
Total

2.2

Count
30
40
5
75

Gender
Female
Male
Total

Count
51
24
75

Field Feedback

At the end of the trial we asked the study coordinator, who was responsible for
consenting patients and applying patient devices, for her observations. We were
interested in the participants’ motivations, complaints, and experience wearing the
device. These anecdotes are paraphrased below.
Patients volunteered due to their awareness of benefits to future treatment.
Most complaints were regarding the inconvenience of the device, possibly due
to other equipment they wore. Importantly it centered around mobility and their
ability to perform ADL’s (activity of daily living). Participation of some subjects
was short, in part due to a short hospital stay, but we had a few patients with
long term participation (three days) without any problems or complications. The
majority of issues required going back to the participant’s room to investigate
the patient device.
There are many factors that affect how long a volunteer would give up her or his time
and comfort to advance science, in particular in time of illness. Figure 4.5 plots the time
each patient wore our device and a histogram of the data. The left figure shows that
participation time did not improve as our clinical trial progressed. This is contrary to
6

what we expected because over the life of the trial we have introduced posters to
advertise the study and its importance. We have also added a short promotion pep talk
given by the study coordinator when she consented volunteers.
The histogram on the right of Figure 2.1 shows that the two greatest groups of
volunteers either wore the device less than 10 hours or between 20 to 30 hours.

40

Number of patients

100

Hours

80
60
40
20
0
0

20

40

60

30
20
10
0
0

80

Patient#

20

40

60
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Figure 2.1 A plot of the time each patient wore the device through the trial duration
(ordered by date), and a histogram showing the distribution of this time.
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Chapter 3
System Architecture
In this section we discuss the architecture of the clinical monitoring system and debate
which type of wireless network would be appropriate in a clinical setting. The system
consists of three major components. Patients wear a wireless patient device that collects
vital sign data (specifically, blood oxygenation and pulse data) during their hospital stay.
As vitals are collected, the patient device transmits the data to a wireless relay network
deployed throughout the hospital wards where our clinical trial is running. The relays
form a low-power wireless mesh network that carries the vital sign data from the patient
devices to our servers (referred to as base stations). The base stations act as an interface
between the WSN and the hospital’s IT systems (via wired Ethernet) and feed real-time
vital sign data to the CDR database. The base stations also provide network monitoring
and logging services that have been invaluable to system performance evaluation during
our clinical trial.
The patient device and wireless relay networks reuse the same design from an earlier
clinical trial detailed in [3], while the base station software has been extended
substantially with new services to support the CDR integration and network
monitoring. The key distinctions between this study and the earlier study reported in [3]
are three-fold: (1) The integration with the hospital IT infrastructure and CDR
compared to standalone WSN. (2) A large-scale, multi-floor and multi-ward deployment
compared to single-ward deployment. (3) Ours is a longitudinal study (14 months).
Each of these characteristics led to important new architecture and code-based for our
system, as well as operational challenges and insights – as reported in this paper.

8

3.1

Patient Device

Each patient device integrates a TelosB [8] mote running the TinyOS [9] operating
system, with a Nellcor pulse oximeter sensor [10], attached to the patient’s finger to
collect pulse rate and blood oxygenation level (SpO2). Nellcor’s sensors use color-coded
connectors; the appliance developed for the first study is compatible with the purple
coded sensors. Nellcor offers a number of sensors, prescribed according to the patient
body weight, duration of monitoring, and activity level. Some sensor models are
disposable and some reusable. We were interested in long participation periods and as a
result we were attentive to the connivance of having sensors being attached to the
patient for long durations and their reliability due to movement. Therefore, as part of
this research we performed a mini-study with and determined that the finger sensor
model MAX-A (adhesive, disposable) was the most convenient both for placement as
well as wearing. This is the only model that we ended up using throughout the trial. The
-A denotes a short cable, which suited our patients, but a longer -AL model is also
available. Other models that could be use are the SC-A that uses Velcro instead of an
adhesive and should be used when the patient has fragile skin. This model also utilizes a
high-efficiency LED to enhance pulse acquisition for patient with thicker, darkly
pigmented skin, or weak pulses. We have never gotten around to actually using this
model because patient’s characteristics were not available when the system alerted the
study coordinator with a candidate patient. In retrospect this was unfortunate because
we have lost some patient data exactly to those reasons. The Dura-Y (an ear sensor that
can also be placed on the finger) sensor, which was recommended by BJC nurses, was
not used in our trial because it was harder to apply and frequently fell off. For research
and development in the Engineering lab we used the reusable DS100A-1 model because
it was very convenient to quickly apply to oneself. Figure 3.1 provides a photo of the
patient device and a data flow diagram of the vital signs in the patient device.

9

Figure 3.1 An open patient device with a
MAX-A sensor attached is shown on the
left.
The data flow diagram below shows, from
left to right, the vital signs path through
the device. The Nellcor sensor acquires
heart rate and blood oxygenation and the
OxiLink interface interprets the light
absorption to digital data. The interface
board connects the OxiLink RS232 output
with a TelosB Mote.

The sensor operates by emitting red and infrared light through the body to a
photodetector. The photodetector's output is wired to an interface called OxiLink made
by Smith Medical. interface [11], which interprets the light absorption data to provide
meaningful heart rate and blood oxygenation readings. A custom circuit board built for
the previous study is used to interface the OxiLink RS232 output with the TelosB and
to perform voltage conversions needed to physically interface the device's constituent
parts. A 9V battery powers the entire patient appliance. The software we authored for
the TelosB controls the power to the sensor and thus collects data at a rate of 1 reading
per minute; otherwise it shuts down the power to conserve battery. After receiving a
sensor reading the TelosB routes the data to the relay infrastructure discussed in the
following subsection using its onboard CC2420 [12] radio. The patient’s device locate
relays using the Dynamic Relay Association Protocol (DRAP) [13], a one-hop protocol
specifically designed to locate a larger routing infrastructure under mobility.

3.2

Relays Network

WSN network coverage is achieved by plugging TelosB nodes into electrical outlets in
patients’ rooms, offices, and elsewhere where it seemed spatially reasonable. The relay
devices use their onboard radios to form a mesh network based on the IEEE 802.15.4
10

low-power wireless networking standard [14]. Figure 3.2 presents a high-level carton of
the resulting network topology. The Collection Tree Protocol (CTP) [15] is employed
on the relay nodes to establish data collection trees rooted at a base station. 802.15.4
wireless links are highly dynamic, due to factors such as external interference. Hence,
CTP is a dynamic routing protocol that uses periodic beacon messages to maintain the
routing infrastructure, autonomously changing the links used to route packets as their
reliability varies over time.

Figure 3.2 A high-level view of the network topology. The figure shows the ward floor
and number, e.g. 11-1 is ward 1 on the 11th floor. Each WSN cloud is attached to a
single base station at a certain time, but the sensors participating in each cloud do
dynamically change cloud membership in response to changing environmental
conditions, and each cloud can be rooted in a different base station for the same
reasons. Each base station interface to the legacy hospital CDR via MQ Series (by IBM)
that transports data between both ends.
In addition to patient data, relay nodes send “beacon” packets to a base station at a rate
of one packet per minute. These beacons provide diagnostic information about the
network’s operation even when no patients are enrolled.
A subtle but important feature of CTP is that each relay aims to find a high-quality path
to some base station, not any base station in particular. Multiple base stations may be
deployed in the same network to provide redundancy, a feature we exploited in our
deployment. As we will discuss later in this paper this decision had a profound (and
sometimes surprising) impact on our network’s behavior.
11

Figure 3.3 presents a snapshot of our relay deployment, taken at a point when our
network was deployed in five wards on three hospital floors (11, 12, and 14). Each ward
was equipped with 14–16 relay nodes and one base station. Black arrows indicate the
links used to form the network’s routing trees. As discussed above the routing paths are
highly dynamic and thus this snapshot frequently changed. Light purple circles denote
the infrastructure relays. Darker purple denote base stations. Red shows relays that are
currently disconnected from the base stations. The bottom left side of the image shows
the network on 11th floor and its two base stations, number 50 on the bottom left and
52 on the center right. The bottom right part of the figure shows the network on the
12th floor and its base station 60. The top of the image shows the 14th floor and its base
station 73.

Figure 3.3 Relays infrastructure across five hospital wards.
We expected that the respective wards would generally form their own isolated routing
paths and that connections among wards would be rare. Nevertheless we placed all the
relays on the same wireless channel (allowing any relay to theoretically connect to any
base station) and deployed several relays in the corridors between the two wards on the
11th floor. Our intention was to provide resilience against base station failure by allowing
relays in one ward to send their data to the base station in another ward, in case of a
12

need. However, as shown in figure 3.3, the relays routinely formed links across wards.
Moreover, because the 12th floor deployment was directly above the 11th floor, routing
trees often crossed through the ceiling and floor despite (as we’ve been told) each floor
being a tick slab of concrete, metal, and other infrastructure). We also discovered that
the 11th floor infrastructure could reliably collect data from patients in the
corresponding 10th floor wards, even without any relays installed on the 10th floor. We
discuss these observations later in the paper. The 14th floor deployment was located two
floors above and in a different section of the building and remained isolated for the
duration of the deployment.

3.3

Base Stations

Each base station consists of a laptop with USB-attached TelosB mote, and acts as an
interface between the 802.15.4 network and the hospital’s wired Ethernet infrastructure.
The base stations are Intel based machines running the Microsoft Windows XP
operating system. The base station manager software is authored in Python and Java
(two languages where used for reasons explained below). We installed a SSH Server on
the machines to allow us to remotely administer them. Each base station is deployed
with base station manager software that we authored with the core functionality
depicted in Figure 3.4. As vital signs produced by patients arrive from the relays mesh
network to the mote attached to one of the base stations, the base station software
consumes the vital sign data.

13

Figure 3.4 Data flow through the data collection system.
Data arrives from the wireless network to the mote attached to the USB port of a base
station. A module called Raw2Obj (not in the figure), and SerialForwarder (which is part of
TinyOS tool-chain) convert the raw data into packets. Raw2Obj was not developed by
this project. It is part of a software library called WSNtestBed developed at our lab for
running our motes test bed. We note that SerialForwarder could assume Raw2Object
functionality now that Jython is an integral part of the software stack. We added
SerialForwarder to our architecture because instead of directly connecting (and blocking)
to the USB port, SerialForwarder allows multiple applications to consume the data by
providing a TCP socket. Our software, the Basestation manager, is one of the consumers
of this socket.
Two types of packets arrive to each base station: network status (beacons”) and
patients’ vital signs. Both are saved in a local SQL DB; with the vital signs also
formatted as HL7 messages, which are then sent to the hospital CDR via a message
queue MQ. The other data paths of the system (System calls, Periodic stats, and Log) are
described in the next sub-sections.
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3.3.1

Software Stack

The base station software is an evolution of software (first version was authored in
Python) we used in prior studies. Predominately, the addition of Java was driven by the
need to use a Java based MQ library because the Python based MQ was too costly for
our research budget. Data is exchanged between Python and Java classes was made
possible by using Jython [16], which is an implementation of the Python programming
language in Java. As such, it provides a seamless objects exchange between the two
languages. This functionality is denoted in Figure 3.5 as Native Python/Java interaction
layer. Furthermore, we purposefully chose an ODBC driver provided by Jython. Thus,
through this Python/Java interaction layer, Python modules running on the base station
can talk to the DB directly, and since the DB driver is authored in Java it makes the DB
natively accessible for the Java modules as well.

Figure 3.5 Base station software stack (major components)
Service wrapper allows our system to run as an OS service (always working and available
whenever the OS is available). The SSH server allows us remote access for system
administration; Depending on the circumstances, we sometimes found that either SSH
or Windows Remote Desktop were more convenient. Surprisingly there were cases where
only one of them gave us access, which of course occurred when we needed it most, so
having both saved us a few trips to the hospital. The OS libs interfaces allowed us to query
the OS, DB, and machine.
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3.3.2

Health Level 7

The vital signs arriving to the Base station manager are formatted according to the
international Health Level Seven (HL7) standard [19] with a converter built on top the
HAPI library [20]. The module named HL7 Formatter in the Figure 3.4 depicts this
functionality. The HL7-formatted vital sign data are then inserted to a Message Queue
(MQ) that reliably transports it to the hospital CDR, over the hospital’s wired Ethernet
network. This particular deployment used the IBM WebSphere MQ library [21] for
consistency with existing hospital IT systems.

3.3.3

SQL Database

The vital signs the network activity are written to the local SQL DB. The base station
manager also logs any important event occurring on the system itself to a local
sequential file. In this implementation we have used the PostgreSQL database [18]
version 9.x.
The DB consist of 2 active tables:
•

paths – a time stamped log of the path via which each node was connected to a
base station. Every 1 minute (assuming that a node had a path to a base station
at that point in time) each node path is recorder.

•

vitals – in which the patients vital signs are stored

The vitals tables stores all data messages received from patients, including invalid
readings. To filter erroneous messages queries on the vitals table should include (among
other filters needed for your desired query) the clause:
where	
  systemFlags	
  =	
  0	
  and	
  signalLevel	
  >=	
  2	
  and	
  avgSpO2	
  !=	
  127	
  and	
  
heartRate	
  !=	
  255	
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The data base also has 4 tables (receive_log, send_log, stats, timing) that are leftovers
from the prior study and were kept in our project only to for compatibility with the
existing code base.
When a consolidated view of the data was desired the databases from the four base
stations where replicated to my laptop and a merged database for analysis was created.
Databases DB50-End, DB52-End, DB60-End, where DB## designate the base station
ID and End designate data at the End of the trial are available. The consolidated
database is named RDS_Analysis-End. This database also contains an additional table
named vitalsFromKevin that holds vitals signs data as they were stored in the legacy
CDR.
The paths table in the consolidated database was cleaned from erroneous records using
the following query, and the analysis presented in this paper was done against the patch_c
table:
create	
  table	
  paths_c	
  
-‐-‐	
  c	
  =	
  clean	
  
as	
  select	
  *	
  from	
  paths	
  
	
  	
  	
  where	
  (	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  (node	
  between	
  100	
  and	
  180)	
  	
  	
  -‐-‐	
  skip	
  181,	
  has	
  only	
  1	
  record	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  or	
  (node	
  between	
  182	
  and	
  187)	
  	
  	
  -‐-‐	
  188,	
  sends	
  multiple	
  packets	
  
per	
  minute,	
  probably	
  due	
  to	
  
hardware	
  failure	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  or	
  (node	
  between	
  189	
  and	
  198)	
  	
  	
  -‐-‐	
  199,	
  has	
  only	
  1	
  record	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  or	
  (node	
  between	
  200	
  and	
  216)	
  	
  	
  -‐-‐	
  currently	
  last	
  node	
  ID	
  in	
  the	
  
deployment	
  is	
  208,	
  our	
  
temporary	
  mote	
  experiments	
  
starts	
  at	
  217	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  )	
  

When using the vitals signs data as it appears in the hospital CDR, the vitalsFromKevin
tables should be used. This table designates missing vital signs as records with status -1
(a patient is suppose to have a vital sign reading every minute). In queries where only
the received vital signs data is of interest use the following query (among other filters
needed for your desired query) to filter those out:
where	
  not	
  ("O2_status"	
  =	
  -‐1	
  or	
  "pulse_status"	
  =	
  -‐1)	
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3.3.4

Continuous Operation

Because vital signs arrive in an asynchronous and continuous manner a malfunctioning
base station means loss of data. To allow the base station software to operate
continuously (for example following loss of power or mandatory operating system
restarts after installing patches) we used a Service Wrapper that enables Java
applications to be run as a Windows Service or UNIX Daemon. In this implementation
we used the Tanuki [17] Java Service Wrapper. Tanuki also provides tools to monitors
the health of the application and the JVM it run on. Running as an OS service starts our
application as part of every Windows boot process.

3.3.5

Network Monitoring

An important feature of our base station software is a suite of network monitoring
services that have proven invaluable for the maintenance. For diagnostic and debugging
purposes, each base station is equipped with a database server (in this implementation
PostgreSQL) that is used to locally log all messages received from the relay network (in
the paths table). This log includes the relays’ diagnostic beacons, which are not
forwarded to the hospital CDR. Extraordinary events are also logged in a time-stamped
sequential file for easy access.

3.3.6

System’s Vital Signs

To track the base stations’ health each server produces and emails a nightly report every
24 hours (configurable). In addition to the information contained in each report the
email itself has proven to be a useful diagnostic tool during the trial: failing to receive a
report is a good early indicator that a base station is disconnected or otherwise
malfunctioning. The key sections of this automatically generated and emailed report are
described in the Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Among other items each report lists the patient
devices that sent data to this base station in the past 24 hours, the number of vital sign
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readings for each device, a list of relays and their current path to the base station, the
status of the local PostgreSQL database, network connections, the status of the attached
mote, and the state of other hardware sub-systems such as storage.

Figure 3.6 The Network Interface (access to the hospital Ethernet) and attached Mote
sections of the periodic status report; as well as all of the relays that are in this base
station’s cloud and their path to the base station.

Figure 3.7 Since our base stations were based on laptops, which were often
disconnected from a power source, it became important to know if it is connected to a
power source (ACLineStatusText) and the expected time the battery has left. Also
reported are the status of the DB and other general resources of the machine.
Most of these pieces of information require access to the local OS service libraries. We
have achieved this functionality using a Java library called Java Native Access (JNA)
[22].
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To help us understand the network performance we developed a utility that queries all
base stations paths tables, each base station at a time, and draws map the network
topology of the last 15 minutes. Figure 3.3 presents an example topology map produced
by this utility. These maps have been particularly useful for identifying network failures
caused by equipment disconnections, which we discuss in more detail in section 4.1.

3.4

Network Type

Any system’s architecture, working in a certain cyber and physical environments, would
have advantages and drawbacks owing to the type of wireless network in use. As any
design alternatives we believe that such questions should not be religiously considered,
that the preferred network will need to be evaluated between major releases, and that
even for a given point in time there is more than a single good choice. In this section we
offer our design considerations as they were in the beginning of the research endeavor,
along with some alternatives that become more relevant as the trial ended.
Unsurprisingly, WLAN (IEEE 802.11, or informally WiFi) [30] seems to offer an
advantage because it was already installed in the hospital. However in closer analysis we
found out that while that WiFi network is available almost everywhere in the hospital,
reception is sporadic in different sections of the hospital. We determined that in order
to provide good network coverage across a hospital ward, in particular due to the
hospital environments, there is going to need to be an access point every 20 to 30
meters. Comparing to a WSN relay that we planned to install every 10 to 20 meters
(before we added extra relays as discussed later in this document), then, a WiFi will save
between 40 to 67 percent of relays. However because each WiFi access point requires an
Ethernet jack, the total cost of ownership (TCO) will be higher if WiFi is used. It is
worth noting that we deliberately chose to use only the printed circuit board antennas of
the relays. Had we used external antennas then the number of WiFi access points and
WSN relays would be equivalent.
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When considering WiFi one also need to take into account that the network may
experience irregular congestion periods because it is not known how many guests will
be using it during the day. There are of course medical grade (and frequency) WiFi
networks, but BJC did not have these available; installing them would require the same
amount of infrastructure as a regular WiFi and we wanted to offer a clinical system that
could be deployed with minimal infrastructure.
WSN offers an advantage in term of energy consumption. Typically WSN transmission
power ratio is between -24 to 0 dBm, while WiFi is 20 to 30 dBm. This is an power
saving factor of 1,000 to 25,000 in favor of WSN.
An additional WSN advantage is the wakeup time, which is 1 to 10 ms for WSN and
about 30 ms for WiFi. In a network of patient device that are mostly asleep and wake
up, at most, every minute – it is an advantage in both response time and energy used
during the wakeup period.
We did not feel that a network technology such as any one of the standards (GSM,
CDMA) available for cell phone networks due to the short distance between the patient
devices to the base stations. However a completely different architecture, which
connects a sensor to a smart phone provided to the patient or allocated to the room
should be considered. The sensor(s) could communicate with the phone using Blue
Tooth or similar network, and the phone will then serves as a mini, or full pledge, base
station, connecting to the rest of the system. We could not explore this approach
because it was not part of the original grant and such architecture has budget
implications.
For completion we would like to mention three additional technologies that should be
considered in future deployments. These are Roofnet network by MIT [31], 2net by
Qualcomm [32], and white space communication [33].
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We choose for our system the WSN (802.15.4) network because it could be deployed
with little to no infrastructure, one simply need to plug a mote into a power outlet. A
patient device wakes up every minute for a few seconds and then goes to sleep,
therefore wakeup time was important to us. And we wanted our device to work at least
a week with a single 9V battery. With those choices, in the beginning of the system
development, WSN was almost the only option available.

22

Chapter 4
System Reliability
In this section, we analyze our deployment’s network and system reliability. We first
assess the overall network reliability based on the beacon packets sent by each relay.
Recall that each relay periodically sends a beacon packet to the base stations using the
same CTP protocol used for transporting regular vital sign data. The collected beacons
give us a comprehensive view of reliability in every area of the network even when there
is no patient enrolled. We then provide an analysis of the reliability of vital-signsdelivery from enrolled patients, offering a direct view of our CPS ability to deliver realtime vital signs using a WSN. This reliability analysis shows that despite many
improvements (articulated in chapter 5) that can still be done to our system, this WSN
was already reliable enough despite our faults.
Due to its location, the 14th floor formed its own network separate from the rest of the
network we study here. As this single-ward network is similar to our previous
deployment studied in [3], henceforth our analysis focuses on the challenges posed by
the larger, multi-ward deployment on the 10th to the 12th floors.

4.1

Relay Connectivity

To analyze the relays availability over time we define a relay as connected based on the
fraction of its beacon messages that were successfully delivered to at least one of the
base stations. On each day, for each relay, we calculate the ratio of the number of
delivered beacons to the expected 1440 beacons/day (1 beacon/minute). We note that a
beacon message may be received by any one of the base stations due to CTP protocol’s
23

design. Our DB is distributed over a number of base stations and we will need to
combine the queries from all of them for correct view of reliability. We define the
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) threshold to designate relays as connected or disconnected
each day as follows:
To be connected, a relay must have successfully delivered 90% of its beacons to
the base stations that day.
Figure 4.1 plots the number of relays connected to some base station over the course of
the deployment. The red curve indicates the number of connected relays for each day of
the deployment, while the purple horizontal lines indicate the total number of relays
physically deployed in the network; shaded regions mark significant events during the
deployment that we discuss below. We note that Figure 4.1 begins at May 24, 2011: due
to factors described in Section 5.5 (Impact of IT procedures) the diagnostic logs needed
to produce this graph are partially incomplete between the initial deployment and May
23; an unfortunate circumstance that mandated that we will exclude this period from
our analysis.

Figure 4.1 The network reliability from May 2011 to May 2012.
The purple line marks the number of deployed relays. The red plot represents the
number of relays connected to the base stations. Significant events are shaded: (a) The
deployment was expanded to ward 3 on July 29. (b) Between August 14 to 25 base
station 52 was unplugged from power. (c) Between Nov. 18 to 23 base station 52 did
not work. (d) Between Feb. 10 to 23 relays disappeared again and for a while we were
prevented from replenishing them because they were in patient isolation rooms. This
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caused the three available base stations to receive only a fraction of their regular traffic.
(e) On April 3 and 4 base station 52 received about half of its usual traffic for unknown
reason; the problem resolved itself without intervention. At the end of the trial relays
were slowly disconnected without replenishing, leading to the gradual decrease in
reliability.
Starting in April 2011, the network was deployed with 11 relays and two base stations
(denoted 50 and 52) at two corresponding ends of wards 1 and 2. When we saw the
poor network reliability we added 19 additional relays a few days later. Even though we
now had good relay density, the network reliability remained poor. The reliability stayed
unacceptable through July and we initially attributed this to relays that physically
disappeared from the hospital, and base station issues which are discussed in the next
section. But despite relay replenishment, our work on improving the base stations, and
other improvements we had made to the system, it did not reach our expected level of
reliability. On July 29, designated as event (a) in figure 4.1, the deployment was
expanded, adding ward 3 exactly one floor above ward 2. Ward 3 was furnished with its
own base station (denoted 60) and 16 additional relays; since ward 3 was within radio
range of wards 1 and 2, the new relays and base stations immediately merged into the
existing infrastructure.
Admittedly more research into the affect of people on low energy networks is needed,
but we hypothesize that the presence of people in this busy hospital, which treats about
400 new patients each month, had a profound effect on the network performance. The
deployment of ward 3 provided paths to base stations through the ceiling and floor,
routes that to some extent avoided links through corridors that are may be heavily
populated with people.
During the initial deployment, we deliberately allowed ward 1 and 2 networks to merge,
expecting that the redundancy would improve connectivity. However, even before
significant relay disappearances took place (discussed in the next section) the network
struggled to achieve high reliability before August. We also noticed anecdotally that the
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network tended to route data to ward 2’s base station; even relays in ward 1 would often
route data to ward 2 as opposed to the (geographically closer) base station in ward 1.
This observation is also reflected in figure 4.1: when ward 1 experienced an outage from
July 22 to July 25 (not highlighted as an event in the figure), it had little effect on
network connectivity: the number of connected (PDR ≥ 90%) relays remained low, but
was largely unaffected by the outage. After the expansion ward 2’s base station has also
proved to be quite important: reliability fell greatly during event (b) between August 14
and 25, when this base station was disconnected from power. Looking closely at the
data from during this outage, we found that it even affected the recently deployed relays
in ward 3. From these observations, we concluded that the two floors’ networks
strongly depended on each other for high reliability.
Even though our deployment planned for some cross-ward traffic this phenomenon
was much more prominent over the duration of the trial than we anticipated. Figure 4.2
shows the proportion of time each relay was connected to each base station, with the
least favored base station (50) handling 13.4% of the traffic. It is worth noting that base
station 50 is installed in the physicians’ consultation room, which has continuous foot
traffic — possibly another indication to the interaction between people and WSNs.
Remedies to these conditions is offered in the next section.
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Figure 4.2 The percent of time relays were connected to a base station (50, 52, and 60).
We see that almost every relay in the deployment divided its time among multiple base
stations.
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4.2

3D Networks

Many of the motes used routes to base stations that are not near them. See for example
the odd choice that relay #115 is making in Figure 3.3. Instead of connecting to the
nearby base station 52 (the purple circle that just below relay 115 in the figure or is
about 7 meters away across the corridor) it connects through the ceiling to relay 174,
then to 152, which in turn connects to base station 52 through the floor. When we
query the DB, it turns out that relay #115 required paths via the ceiling (and possible
back through the floor) 45% of the time. Many other motes, in fact most of them,
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required such paths (see Figure 4.3). We name such network topology, 3D Networks.
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Figure 4.3 The proportion-of-time motes on the 11th floor used routing paths via the
ceiling (floor). The left plot is ordered by proportion and we see that 9 motes never
required such paths.
The right plot is the histogram of the data, demonstrating that most motes require 3D
paths in high proportion of their routes.
Figure 4.3 show that 9 relays (number 102, 110, 111, 118, 119, 125, 126, 128, and 177)
did not use 3D paths. Relay 177 is the only exception in this group, using 3D path 1.8%
of the time. Those 9 relays disappeared from the hospital before the deployment of the
network on the 12th floor. Had they been part of the network following the 12th floor
deployment they might have used this 3D path diversity as well.
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Possibly more interesting investigation would reason on relays requiring 3D paths in
more than 50% of the instances. To explain our analysis we draw your attention to
Figure 3.3, and Tables 4.1 displaying all relays requiring 3D paths in more than 50% of
the instances, and 4.2 requiring 3D paths in less than 50% of the instances. The tables
list the relay#, the proportion of the instances it used 3D paths, whether a direct path to
a nearby base station required an airway path through areas that may be with heavily
populated, and a comments column.
Table 4.1 Relays using 3D paths more than 50% of the instances. The table is sorted by
the 3D path% column.
Relay#
163
151
208
191
197
104
195
124
169
122
171
196
193
131
129
159
117
130
170
185
132
173
107
120
105
161

3D path%
82%
82%
79%
76%
75%
74%
72%
70%
69%
69%
68%
67%
67%
67%
65%
64%
62%
62%
61%
59%
59%
58%
55%
54%
53%
52%

Via people
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Comments
Family waiting room
Family waiting room
Family waiting room
Family waiting room
Family waiting room
Elevator lobby
Linen closet
Elevator lobby
Nurses' station
Lead Charge Nurse office

Nurses' station
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Table 4.1 demonstrate that all relays that used 3D paths in more than 50% of the
instances, did that despite sometimes having a more direct path to a nearby base station.
The “Via people” column suggests that all of these plausibly more direct airways had to
pass through areas in the hospital that, at times, are heavily populated. To the extent
that at a given time this people/radiation interaction rendered a direct path less reliable
the relay chose an alternate 3D path. In the “Comments” column we also offer
additional support for this hypothesis. We see that there is a direct correspondence
between the proportions of instances that a 3D path was required to the areas that are
more likely to have larger amount of people.
The next Table, 4.2, demonstrates that relays, which used 3D paths in less than 50% of
the instances, were installed in areas with likely less dense population. The three
exceptions of relays in this table that did require a passage through people are of relays
that are 1 hop away from a nearby base station. The nearness to the base station is the
probable cause compensating for the energy absorb by people and the reason that these
relays appear in table 4.2 instead of 4.1.
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Table 4.2 Relays using 3D paths less than 50% of the instances. The table is sorted by
the 3D path% column and the rows of relays with a routing path to a base station that
require passage through heavily populated areas are shaded.
Relay#
114
123
115
127
157
179
108
198
106
113
121
153
194
112
103
109
177

3D path%
49%
46%
45%
44%
42%
38%
36%
36%
34%
28%
26%
23%
21%
19%
17%
14%
2%

Via people
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
?
No

Comments

1 hop away from BS #52
Staff pantry
1 hop away from BS #52
Physician workroom
1 hop away from BS #52

1 hop away from BS #52
1 hop away from BS #50
Location uncertain

An interesting question is weather there was something special about the 11th floor that
caused this behavior, or is the 12th floor relays going to behave in a similar way? If the
11th floor motes seek the 12th floor infrastructure in such high proportion, will the 12th
floor relays do without 3D paths?
As an answer we provide Figure 4.3 showing the behavior of the 12th floor relays.
Indeed, we see that most of the relays (12 out of 15) required 3D paths in more than
50% of the routes.
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Figure 4.4 The proportion-of-time motes on the 12th floor used routing paths via the floor
(ceiling). The left plot is ordered by proportion.
The right plot is the histogram of the data, demonstrating that 12 relays out of 15 required
3D paths in more than 50% of their routes.
Since we did not solidify our 3D Networks idea during the trial and the analysis we
perform here is retrospective, further research will be needed to validate this hypothesis,
and there may be other causes, beyond people for this behavior. It was also suggested
by our Medical school collaborators that hospital food carts might pose a periodic daily
problem. These metal carts are high and could act as Faraday cages, but they are not
present in the corridors long enough (time wise) to explain such high proportion of 3D
paths.
Before the deployment in the 12th floor this need for 3D Networks critically affected
our system performance. It is likely to affect similar CPS deployed around people’s daily
lives. WSNs clearly offer advantages with its low energy consumption, duty cycling
techniques, and other advancements that researchers have made in the last decade – but
these techniques are exactly what makes a WSN sensitive to interference such as the
presence of people. This is a quandary because we often would like to deploy CPS
purposely around people, it is the interaction of people-and-system that makes it a CPS;
and many of the promises of CPS (smart homes, augmented reality, smart civil
infrastructure, disaster mediation, and so on) can be delivered only when CPS are
deployed around people daily lives.

31

One possible (and simple) solution to this quandary, applicable to almost any
deployment around people (including deployment with a single base station, and those
that would not be able to take advantage of multiple floors and 3D paths) is to install
the motes at the ceiling level.
To support future researchers interested in this quandary we mention the following
operating characteristics of our network: (1) Relays were operating only with their
printed circuit board antennas; (2) The radio operates in the unlicensed 2.4GHz band;
(3) All of our relays use the default 26 frequency band; (4) CTP was used for routing. In
spot checks that we have performed at the beginning and near the end of the project
the electromagnetic radiation at channel 26 was free of wireless interferences. An
example to such a spectrum map is presented in Figure 4.5. Following [23] we consider
a noise level above -85 dBm noisy enough to cause a Chipcon CC2420 radio to drop
packets. In the example provided in the figure we see that channel 26 does not
introduce that risk, hence packets (in this case) are not likely to be drooped due to
interference from other electronic devices, and the interference must stem from other
sources.
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Figure 4.5 Spectrum map accumulated during 30 minutes observation. The X-axis
indicates 802.15.4 channels (11 to 26). In the middle and lower figure the Y-axis
indicates power. In the middle figure each colored dot (at position x GHz and energy
level of y dBm) indicates how often a signal was detected for this ordered pair. The
colors represent values in the range shown on the colorbar. Because the area over
channel 26 has mostly blue dots (a transmission was detected close to 0.0% in this area)
and the power is below -100 dBm (only signals above -85 dBM can interfere with a
CC2420 radio) we conclude that channel 26 barley (or not at all) experiance
electromagnetic interferences.
Figure 4.5 suggest that frequency hoping in the environment where our system was
deployed will not improve the network reliability because channel 26, which we used
exclusively in our network, is completely free of interference. In fact channel hoping
will only introduce delays, consume energy, and will lower the reliability in such cases
because it is bound to hop into noisy channels.
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4.3

Vital Signs Delivery

The effect of the critical events in the network reliability over the trial’s lifetime surely
affects the fraction of vital signs actually arriving to a base station from the patient.
How bad was it, or how good was it, despite all of these adverse events it what we set to
study in this sub-section. Figure 4.6 plots the fraction of each patient’s vital signs that
were successfully delivered to a base station. Before the July 29 expansion the
fluctuating quality of the routing relay infrastructure led to corresponding fluctuations in
vital signs delivery. However, after the expansion the reliability improved dramatically.
Before the expansion only 25.0% of the patients had at least 70% of their vital signs
successfully delivered over the network, compared to 85.4% afterwards. A cursory look
at the study coordinator notes on post-expansion patients and base station logs revealed
cases of low reliability that can be attributed to extraordinary (not WSN related) factors.
For example, one patient was enrolled when base station 52 was off (event (c)). Another
was enrolled for only three hours during their hospital discharge, and a detailed
examination of her/his database records shows sporadic valid readings, spread among
long intervals with no data being received, and intervals of the network successfully
delivering finger out of device errors. One probable cause for such a pattern could be
that the patient was out-of-range of our deployment span during the discharge process.

1

%Delivered

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

Jul 01 2011 Oct 01 2011 Jan 01 2012 Apr 01 2012

Figure 4.6 The fraction of each patient’s vital signs data that is successfully delivered to
a base station.
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Delivery of at least 70% of the vital signs of 85.4% of patients does suggest that WSN
are reliable and can be used for clinical monitoring. First and foremost, by following the
insights we offer in Chapter 5, clinical systems can be made much more reliable from
the get go. Second, compared to a manual process in which a nurse collects vital signs
every few hours we are judging the system’s ability to deliver a vital sign every minute.
Certainly the average reliability of 85.4% could be improved if we relax this demand and
deliver, for example, a vital sign every 5 or 10 minutes.
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Chapter 5
Lessons Learned
The system has many components such as wireless networking, multiple servers,
embedded and regular software, and integration with CDR. We considered all of these
pieces within the span of a CPS system, and thus our responsibility. Surprisingly, only
few of the challenges we faced stemmed from the many integration points, or as a result
of technology in general. While previous research focused on technological solutions,
our experiences show that human factors may play at least an equal role in the reliability
and usability of a CPS system. In this section we articulate the key challenges and
provide suggestions how to avoid them in future deployment. Our discussion revolves
around the following key types of challenges: the use of multiple base stations, the need
for fault tolerant design, we offer some comments on obtaining correct data for
network analysis, we re(discovery) the importance of a well designed user experience,
the impact of IT procedures, the effects of the hospital environment, the importance of
how things look, and we end with our comments on research administration. Each of
the following sections will describe the challenge, the solutions that we took during the
on going trial (if it was possible), and recommendations for future research and
deployments.

5.1

Multiple Base Stations

Challenge

Multiple base stations can be both a challenge and a blessing. As

discussed in section 4.1 the importance of this added infrastructure was quite surprising
at first as ward 3 was separated from wards 1 and 2 by a thick ceiling that is full of metal
and other hospital building infrastructure. Before the deployment time, it was not clear
that ward 3’s infrastructure would merge with the existing infrastructure at all, much less
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significantly reinforce it. We do not attribute this unexpected improvement to an
increased network density, since density was comparable in all three wards and adding
relays did not improve the reliability.
Solutions

Previous studies have discussed network density in the context of area

coverage, or added relays, but our experience suggests that such coverage alone may not
be the only critical factor in heavily populated environments. Our experiences
emphasize the importance of leveraging multiple base stations to enhance reliability and
the advantages of protocols such as CTP that exploit multiple base stations
automatically. Had we deployed the networks in all three wards as separate “subnetworks” instead of allowing them to merge, wards 1 and 2 would have continued to
suffer significant data loss, and ward 3 would be less reliable as well. We state two chief
design considerations: (1) Multiple base station and their spatial placement (i.e. not just
relays spatial distribution) within WSNs are crucial for network connectivity and
reliability. (2) Three-dimensional network topologies provide route diversity that
enhances reliability in busy buildings, providing new path diversity and thus resiliency
against possible interference by humans and other factors.
Recommendations

Deploy base stations for redundancy. If the physical

environment allows, deploy the base stations such that 3D network form a resilient
routing infrastructure. While it is possible to form 3D networks with relays alone we
believe that there is more path diversity, rendering the network more resilient, when the
base stations themselves offer a 3D paths to terminate on a different level than where
the destination is. However, when it is not practical use multiple base stations, or to
place them at different levels, it is an advantage to deploying the relays on multiple
floors. A practical solution that may avoid the problem all together is to install the
motes above people’s height. As a WSN community we can develop a simple
“extension cord apparatus” that powers a mote using a cable extending from the power
outlet to the ceiling height, where the mote would reside. This would allow motes to use
communication airways that do not go through people, who absorb some of the
electromagnetic radiation and thus interfere with the network operation.
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5.2

Fault Tolerant Systems

5.2.1

Integration Points

Challenge

Some software failures on a base station are particularly disruptive

because, in contrast to hardware failures, the base station’s attached mote will continue
to receive power and act as data sink. Under a hardware failure, relays would begin to
re-route their data to another base station under the guidance of a protocol such as
CTP. However, under software failures, the base stations effectively converts into a
“black hole”: receiving power, the base station’s motes would still advertise themselves
as data sinks, but, but lacking a client to consume the packets the mote would silently
discard any incoming data. Hence, even circumstances beyond the control of the data
collection system (such as an operating system failures on a base station) can lead to
quality degradation. Such monitoring needs to become part of the system’s
responsibility, despite the fact that the system is not working at the moment.
Unfortunately, the nature of the failure means that we cannot estimate the amount of
data lost to software failures in our current deployment.
Recommendations

The system design should incorporate fault detection and

recovery mechanisms to deal with both software and hardware failures. We find such
design intellectually stimulating in particular because we are asking a system to monitor
events when the system itself is not working. For example in the case of the base
station’s attached mote, it would turn into this “black hole” through which endless data
would be lost when the base station software is not present to consume its data. Upon
detection of a base station failure the gateway mote attached to the base station should
stop broadcasting that it is a viable sink immediately. A specific challenge to the way
motes are constructed today is posed because motes cannot query the server to which it
is attached. The detection of such a fault can reside with the embedded software on the
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mote or within the network because those are two components that are properly
functioning in this particular example. Focusing on the part of the system that does
work in this case yields a fault tolerant solution. The mote software should periodically
be receiving status messages from the server and the arrival of such messages indicates
that the software is in working condition. However, as soon as such messages stop to
arrive, the mote should stop advertising itself as a viable sink.
Similar mechanisms should be designed for each part of the system that may fail. In
general we believe that the following design pattern can guide the thinking process.
1. Identify a possible Faulty module of the system, F, which is not functioning
under this scenario.
2. Identify modules of the system does do work, Wi, under this this scenario.
3. If a working module Wi can check a status flag on a non-functioning part F,
then the lack of response indicates that F does not work. Otherwise,
4. Design a simple message exchange protocol such that the lack of arrival of a
message from F to Wi indicates that F does not work.

5.2.2

Access to Individual Motes

Challenge

Often during this long study we wished we had direct software access to

an individual mote. Either to check its status, know its current location, or query its ID
in order to return it to its original location. This is not possible with unidirectional (from
leaves (relays) to the root (relay attached to the server)) protocols such as CTP, but it is
possible with IPv6 (or similar address based) protocol. We consider the system’s ability
to query individual components of its infrastructure part of its ability to respond in realtime to events, and part of becoming a fault tolerant system.
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Recommendations

The advantages and disadvantages of address-less vs. address-

based protocols is a design decision, per the system particular goals. However, we
recommend, for hospital clinical systems (or similar environment in which motes can be
moved by people or get lost in a large spatial space) to use address-based protocols such
as IPv6. The same recommendation holds if the CPS needs to be fault tolerant because
the system needs to be aware of the constituents of its infrastructure. Address-based
protocols allow access to each individual device in the network. However, this
recommendation poses a new set of challenges for WSN based CPS. These challenges
come from the inherent requirement of specifying a destination for each packet. CTP’s
advantage is that a packet is just being sent into the network and without flooding or
broadcasting the packet will arrive to one of the base stations. Flooding and
broadcasting are not energy efficient on any network, but this issue is more prominent
in the context of WSN and its low energy goals. Additionally, specifying an address for
each packet that is sent using an IPv6 or similar protocol, strips away one of the biggest
advantages we have discovered in this trial – the base station redundancy. As a reminder
(see section 5.1) we hypothesized that this will be a key contributor to network reliability
in densely populated areas. It certainly was so in our trial. As the last design
consideration we mention that broadcasting in the context of WSN lowers the system
scalability by consuming its limited bandwidth. This Thesis is not the place for a new
protocol design, nor we have enough information to even suggest that, but we intent to
explore protocols that will marry benefits from the two approaches.

5.3

Network Analysis

5.3.1

Motes Numbering

Challenge

Each mote in the network had a unique ID that identified its hardware

in the cloud. This ID was used to denoted its physical location on the floor layout of the
hospital. As noted elsewhere in this paper, in crowded environment motes will tend to
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disappear and will need to be replaced. Those motes can also reappear in a different
room in the hospital, which is the worse case scenario if you are interested in
performing a network spatial analysis because this mote ID is associated with its original
location.
Solutions

As soon as we noted that motes could be moved around we trained the

hospital staff and our study coordinator about the importance of having a good track
over motes locations. It is uncertain to what extent this was effective as we continued to
experience motes disappearances until the end of the trial. This should be expected in
environments where new people pass by every day.
Recommendations

Two cases should be considered whenever spatial network

analysis is part of the study:
(1) When a disappearing mote is replenished with new mote hardware, the new
mote must be assigned the original mote ID.
(2) If a mote ID appears in a new location, it should not be allowed to join the
network before its ID is changed.
We recommend separating the TinyOS Active Message ID (AM-ID) from the location
ID discussed in this section. AM-ID in TinyOS is determined during compile time and
becomes part of the object code. Using this ID as the location ID puts the burden of
managing the inventory of location IDs on the researcher, which is error prone and
inflexible because the ID is attached to a particular hardware. We recommend that a
different set of IDs that can be dynamically assigned will be used for network spatial
analysis. The Location-ID (LID) should be managed from a centralized location and an
LID consumption mechanism should be developed. The following design objectives
should be taken into account:
•

Mechanisms to automatically assign LIDs during the initial installation are
required. These needs to include assigning LIDs to a large number of motes that
have not yet joined the network.

•

A researcher that walks into the premises with a mote should not automatically
consume a LID as this mote might be unrelated to this deployment.
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•

A mote should not continue to operate as a relay upon its disconnection from a
power outlet. This can be managed by the mote’s disconnection alarm (see
section 5.5.1).

•

Mechanisms to address (1) and (2) above are required.

5.3.2

Motes Spatial Location

Challenge

We found out that in a large study as ours, spanning over large areas, full

of other equipment and people, it is not easy to find motes even if you know that they
are in a certain room. To be attentive to other hospital priorities and mission we
plugged our relay motes into any available power outlet that was not regularly used for
medical equipment. We ended up with motes in different locations in each room, which
made them hard to find. As a result when we looked for a mote in a room full of other
hospital equipment we were often wondering whether it was removed from the room or
we are just not looking in the right spot.
Solutions

In later stages of the trial we implemented the FRBL cardinal direction

system described below.
Recommendations

In future deployment we recommend, based on the available

power resources, that a couple of consistent locations would be preferred. Furthermore,
each installed mote should be registered with the room number and spot in the room.
One such simple scheme that proved beneficial for us is similar to the NESW cardinal
direction system. We coined our system the FRBL cardinal direction. In this system we
denote on which wall a mote is located relative to a person just entering the room and
standing in the doorway. The letter F denotes that the mote is on the wall in Front of
the entry door, B for Behind denotes the door’s wall (or just Behind the person entering
the room), and R/L denote on the Right/Left wall respectively. Of course the known
NESW can also be used where N denotes on front wall, E on the right wall, S is the
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back wall, and W on the left wall. However some people may find this odious because
of the probable mismatch with Earth magnetic direction.

5.4

End User Indicators

Challenge

The patient wireless device we used for this trial was developed for a

much smaller, previous study, in which it was used successfully. The larger scale of our
study coupled with the fact that the patient populations in our study was very frail
surfaced a usability design issue that we could not address in the middle of the trial. The
existing patient device has no visual or audible indicators. There is no way to know if it
is ON or OFF, there is no way to know if it is sensing vital signs (valid or not), and no
battery level data is available. The lack of these statuses meant that they could not be
sent to the research coordinator or be indicated on the device.
Recommendations

All of these issues will need to be addressed in future revisions

of the patient device. For the author of this paper at least, as an engineer who is always
trying to build minimalistic and functional hardware or software that does exactly what
it is suppose to do, and no more – this was an excellent lesson in machine-user
interaction. For me, putting numerous indicators would not be a question anymore. In a
technological age as ours, where storage and to a good extent network bandwidth are
not scarce resources anymore, I would even dare to say: the more meaningful indicators
there are – the merrier. I draw the same conclusion for building hardware and software
that exposes internal indicators (e.g. battery level) and building mechanisms that gives
the system (and the users at the UI level) visibility to them.

5.5

Impact of IT Procedures

Challenge

A common challenge for IT in many enterprise networks is ensuring

data security and privacy while also giving users enough access to perform their jobs.
When moving deployments from a test bed to an enterprise setting it is important to
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work closely with IT to understand how these policies may affect the deployment. For
example, we used laptops as base stations and thus this equipment was treated as enduser equipment. In our case this meant the equipment was preinstalled with a disk image
containing mandatory full disk encryption, user-level backups, and a centrally managed
software updates policy was enforced. Shortly after the deployment we encountered
unanticipated conflicts between these policies and our base stations’ normal activities,
which were to be performed continuously and in real-time. The end-user level backup
software, for example, would mandatory start and block the database server from its
real-time work. As another example, after every patch update (e.g. OS, security) that
required a reboot the base station would wait for the user to input a password to
“unlock” the encrypted hard drive.
Solutions

We worked with IT to clarify that patient information on these base

stations we sanitized according to HIPAA rules. Consequentially the base stations were
exempted from full disk encryption and backups2, and reboots were reduced to once a
month for critical patches. We also changed our software to run as an OS service so it
will be started automatically after a reboot.
Recommendations

The integration to the hospital infrastructure and policies are

two different objectives, and the integration-design process could be lengthy. These
policies would require the system to have additional logic to handle these procedures
and this logic may be unrelated to the core system’s functions. To incorporate these
functions therefore, it is important to start discussions with the organizational IT during
the system design. This may lead to selection of alternate equipment such as nonportable or server-class machines, which falls under different policies and often use
server-class software that is more suitable for continuous server work. It is also
important to test the system on-site with the software functionality that accommodates
the hospital policies; as such integration issues would not manifest themselves in
standalone WSNs test bed. Some policies should be incorporated into the network

2

Manual database backups were performed periodically using a utility provided by the database vendor.
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design as well, e.g., proactively re-computing routes to avoid machines that are under
temporary scheduled maintenance.

5.6

Hospital Environment

5.6.1

Relay Disconnections

Challenge

The relay devices and base station were initially deployed without any

labels that indicate they were part of a clinical monitoring system. In the beginning of
the deployment our relays, base stations, and base stations motes were repeatedly
disconnected. The staff indicated that some devices were unplugged and set aside out of
curiosity or suspicion. We also believe that some devices have been unplugged by
cleaning staff who needed the power outlets since there was no indication that the
device was important, nor was it plugged to the hospital medical-class power outlets. It
is worth noting that our experience contradicts the common assumption that power is
an unlimited resource in indoor WSN deployments because we may leverage available
power outlets. Relying on power outlets involves the tradeoff of making the deployment
susceptible to disconnections; similar issues were experienced in a residential study [24].
Solutions

Labeling is crucially important. While we still experience relays

disconnections to date, the frequency lowered dramatically after we labeled the relays.
As shown in figure 5.1, new relay devices are now deployed with laminated labels. The
label is designed to conceal the exposed circuit board, making them appear less
suspicious. Similar labels have been attached to the base stations’ lids to discourage
disconnections or personal use and prevent disconnections of their attached motes.
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Figure 5.1 The relay device before and after labeling.

5.6.2

Base Stations Disconnections

Challenge

During the trial, base stations were disconnected from the power,

network, or attached motes. These base stations act as bridges between the WSN and
the hospital’s CDR database and such disconnects degraded the quality of the system.
Base station disconnections were particularly surprising: in contrast to the relay nodes,
which were deployed in patient rooms and hallways, the base stations were in rooms
only accessible to hospital staff. We soon discovered that location sends a message.
Solutions

We used laminated labels for the base stations, their attached motes, and

power cables; as well as relays.
Recommendations

With these experiences in mind we have a number of

recommendations: (1) Equipment should not only be able to perform its task but also
professionally display its purpose (e.g., base stations should be server-class machines, as
much for appearance, as for the robust hardware). (2) Equipment should be installed in
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appropriate locations that discourage casual tampering, personal use, or disconnections.
(3) Labels should clearly indicate that the base station is medical equipment. (4) Labels
should warn against disconnection on cables near susceptible outlets or ports (when
someone is under the desk looking for an Ethernet port or a power outlet they do not
know which cable is medically important).

5.6.3

Disconnection Alarm

Challenge

We plugged our relay motes into power outlets but they did not always

stay there. Operating under the assumption that our motes will have limitless power
(being plugged into an outlet) we did not equip them with batteries. In a busy hospital it
can be expected that devices will be unplugged and reappear in a different location or
not plugged back at all.
Solutions

It was not practical for us to use a disconnection alarm because it would

require someone to be present in the hospital at all times to attend to it and we were
budgeted only for a part time study coordinator.
Recommendations

In future studies we recommend to equip the motes with

batteries despite the fact they will be plugged into a power outlet. A disconnection
mechanism can then send an alert, immediately upon disconnect, to a monitoring
module of the system. We also believe that sounding an audio alert upon disconnection
may encourage the person to return the mote to its place immediately. The battery will
also allow the mote to stay in communication with the monitoring module and indicate
its current location. The signal strength relevant to other motes, or even its path to the
base station can be used as location indicators.
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5.6.4

Professional Medical Standards

Challenge

There are a number of topics that fall under this category. They are all

discussed in the recommendation section.
Recommendations

We already discussed using server-class machines as medical

equipment in section 5.6.2. In fact, with our desire to run everything on standard
hardware almost every project that uses regular computers for specialty-use (e.g. as
medical equipment) runs the risk of being treated as a computer for surfing the Internet.
During research, when it does not make sense to externally brand your equipment, one
good course of action is to use machines that look a little bit different. Standardize on
the same equipment in all locations, install them in “medically reserved spots”, and
clearly label the equipment. This will brand your equipment as close as you can to a
medical equipment during the research period and may prevent tampering with its
operation.
Health risks are a hazard that hospital staff is aware of, and is trained to deal with.
However this may be new ground for computer scientists and engineers. Get trained
before the deployment starts. Many, if not all, hospitals have a department responsible
for sterilization procedures. Get in touch with them and be consulted on proper
sterilization of the equipment between patients or before equipment is returned to the
lab for maintenance (you may want to note that in the lab journal). This may be
particularly important if other students or lab mates will use the equipment after the trial
has ended.
If your equipment is not disposable then after sterilization we recommend it would be
sealed and packaged as appropriate. This makes the device (and the project as a whole)
appear more professional. We also believe it will make the volunteers feel more
comfortable because this is what they see when commercial equipment or utensils are
used during their treatment.
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Finally we recommend that you will get a lab coat, it usefully reduces the risk of carrying
pathogens back to your car, office, or home; and it makes you part of the professional
hospital team.

5.7

Research Administration

5.7.1

Lab Journal

Challenge

There are many events that transpire in a study that spans a long

duration or large grounds. For example, patients may decide to stop wearing the device
on their own or a base station may be shutdown by someone. To correlate events with
the system or network performance we sifted through emails, but this is very
inconvenient, time consuming, and inaccurate method. It is almost guaranteed that you
will not find a record of everything that occurred during the trial.
Solutions

To the extent that we could, we archived every research related email in

personal folders. Some people switched to gmail for its superior search.
Recommendations

A properly managed lab journal (paper based or electronic) will

help you get closer to the truth when it comes to events in the project life.
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Chapter 6
Related Work
Industry is offering wireless telemetry solutions such as the GE Healthcare’s ApexPro
telemetry system [25], Sotera WIRELESS’s ViSi Mobile System [26], and Philips’s
IntelliVue cableless solution [27]. Each of those technologies (and our own) presents
different strengths and limitations. The commercial wireless solutions require an
installation of dedicated infrastructure such as wired access points (i.e. a WiFi AP
requires a wired Ethernet connection) which are labor intensive to install and costly. In
contrast, WSN technology employs low-power wireless mesh networking that can be
easily deployed without any fixed infrastructure (other than power outlets). The costeffectiveness and ease of deployment makes WSNs particularly attractive for resource
constrained clinical settings such as field hospitals, rural areas, and developing countries.
Lastly, these wireless technologies require more power than WSN, which is based on
low-power wireless standards such as IEEE 802.15.4 [12]; hence portable devices based
on low-power WSNs may be deployed with slimmer batteries or may require less
frequent charging.
Previous studies have found great promise in WSNs for emerging medical applications
such as emergency care in disaster areas [4, 28, 29], assisted living and residential
monitoring [6], and early detection of clinical deterioration [3, 4]. In contrast to the
study described in this paper, these prior studies were deployed as standalone WSNs
and were not integrated with the legacy hospital systems. Moreover, these deployments
were limited to a single unit or a relatively small area. As we have seen in our study
larger spans of WSN call for additional design considerations.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Wireless networks have shown promise for real-time clinical monitoring in hospitals. In
this work we evaluate the question whether a subset of wireless network, namely lowpower wireless, can be used to build a reliable clinical monitoring cyber physical system.
We focus on low-power networks because of advantages such as easy deployment and
energy consumption. This paper presents the lessons and insights learned from a 14month deployment of a large-scale WSN for vital sign monitoring in a major hospital.
Salient features of our system are scale (spanning four hospital floors) and integration
with existing IT infrastructure and CDR systems in a hospital. We present important
and sometimes surprising findings that were not reported in previous WSN
deployments in hospitals and other environments. (1) Base station placement is crucial
for reliable data collection and allowing subnetworks to communicate with each other
can effectively increase the overall system’s reliability and render it more resilient to
hospital events. (2) Network reliability can be increased by designing for 3D network
topologies. (3) Fault tolerant design is necessary to progress towards production-wordy
CPS deployments. (4) Designing meaningful end-user indicators can make a positive
impact on a CPS. (5) It is crucial to deal with equipment disconnections even in a wellcontrolled hospital environment, and to establish protocols that recover and proactively
discourage these disconnections.
Our results lead to guidance and best practices of deploying large-scale WSNs in
hospital environments and other large-scale WSNs.
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